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1. Introduction
Distinct consumer groups or markets for a product frequently di¤er in their costs of service
or demands. A large literature studies the welfare e¤ects, relative to uniform pricing, of dif-
ferential pricing across markets based solely on demand elasticities classic third-degree price
discrimination under monopoly or oligopoly. See, for example, Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers
(2010) and references therein for monopoly third-degree price discrimination; and Holmes (1989)
and Stole (2007) for the oligopoly case. Very little work has compared uniform pricing (UP) and
di¤erential pricing (DP) when, instead, markets vary in costs of service. Yet DP motivated (at
least partly) by cost di¤erences is controversial and frequently subject to various constraints in
monopoly or oligopoly markets, such as gender-neutral requirements in insurance or pensions,
universal-service mandates on utilities, antidumping rules in international trade, and consumer
resistance to add-on pricing such as airline bag fees.1
This paper analyzes the welfare e¤ects of (cost-based) di¤erential pricing by oligopoly rms.
If markets were perfectly competitive, DP obviously would be desirable, as prices would equal
marginal costs in each market hence maximize welfare, whereas UP would distort the output
allocation. However, the ranking is no longer clear when prices exceed marginal costs, as Chen
and Schwartz (2015) show for the case of monopoly: moving from UP to DP there can reduce
consumer surplus (aggregated across markets) and while raising prot can also reduce total
welfare, albeit under rather stringent demand curvature conditions. In oligopoly, the welfare
analysis of DP is even richer due to at least two new forces: (1) when rms supply di¤erentiated
products, the pricing equilibria will depend also on cross-price elasticities2; and (2) rms may
di¤er in their costs within each market, and the pricing equilibria then will depend on the pattern
of cost asymmetry even with homogeneous products.
We consider a setting with two competing rms, each selling a single product in two distinct
markets. To isolate the role of cost di¤erences, we assume the markets have equal demand
1The constraints on cost-based DP can stem from various sources: government policy, contractual restrictions,
consumer perceptions of the likely e¤ects, or transaction costs. For further discussion and examples, see Chen
and Schwartz (2015), Edelman and Wright (2015), and Nassauer (2017). On add-on pricing generally see Ellison
(2005) and Brueckner et al. (2015).
2Mrázová and Neary (2017) show that any well-behaved demand function for a single product can be repre-
sented by its elasticity and curvature. With di¤erentiated products, cross-price elasticity is additionally needed.
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elasticities but di¤erent marginal costs of service. Firms sell symmetrically di¤erentiated or
homogeneous products and compete in prices under the alternative UP and DP regimes.3 In
our main model, the rms also have symmetric costs the same cost within a market and
sell di¤erentiated products. This environment serves two purposes. It reveals how the welfare
properties of DP under monopoly (Chen and Schwartz, 2015) may di¤er in oligopoly solely
due to the cross-elasticity/substitution e¤ect; and it permits a natural comparison to price
discrimination in symmetric oligopoly analyzed by Holmes (1989). An extension of the model
retains demand symmetry between rms but allows rms to have asymmetric costs.
In our main model, a major factor is the pass-through rate from rmscommon marginal
cost to their symmetric equilibrium price.4 Under UP each rm sets price based on the average
of its marginal costs across markets, whereas under DP it sets prices based on each markets
specic marginal cost. Moving to DP e¤ectively lowers rmsmarginal cost in one market and
raises cost in the other market, with the equilibrium price adjustments determined by the pass-
through rate. Our unifying approach to analyzing the welfare e¤ects of DP examines when
each welfare measure is convex or concave in marginal cost. We obtain necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for DP to raise consumer surplus, prot, or total welfare (Propositions 1-3), based on
general properties of the demand system (which also determine the pass-through rate): curvature
and own- and cross-price elasticities, and how they vary as rms change price equally. These
conditions reduce to their counterparts for monopoly DP and hence neatly nest the latter
when cross-price e¤ects vanish. Throughout, we trace the welfare changes to endogenous forces,
such as the change in average price and extent of output reallocation between markets.
Consumer surplus is subject to the same forces as under monopoly when moving to DP.
Consumers in the aggregate benet from the price dispersion. But average price can rise with
DP, as occurs if the pass-through rate is greater at higher than at lower prices along the common
demand function of the two markets. Potentially, consumers can lose on balance (though we
have not found such an example for di¤erentiable demands).
3Hereafter, unless stated otherwise, DP refers to cost-based. These alternative pricing regimes can be attained
through interventions that do not require knowledge of costs: laissez faire yields DP, whereas prohibiting any price
di¤erences yields UP. Cowan (2018) analyzes regulatory schemes that constrain a monopolists price-cost margins,
schemes that improve welfare but require the regulator to know costs.
4For a general analysis of pass-through in various applications see Weyl and Fabinger (2013).
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Unlike for monopoly, DP can reduce prots in oligopoly.5 This can occur in two ways. First,
DP induces excessive output reallocation between markets when pass-through exceeds one, as
the price di¤erence overshootsthe cost di¤erence so the prot margin becomes smaller in the
(low-cost) market that gains output. Under monopoly, DP nevertheless raises prot for any
pass-through rate, because a rate above one requires demand to be highly convex, in which case
the price dispersion chosen by a monopolist yields a large output expansion (Chen and Schwartz,
2015). In oligopoly, however, pass-through can be high not only due to demand curvature but
also due to cross-price e¤ects between rms. Consequently, DP can reallocate output excessively
and without expanding total output enough to outweigh this misallocation e¤ect (though in our
CES demand example, prot does not increase only in limiting cases). Second, DP can reduce
average price, while also reducing output. If the products are closer substitutes at lower prices
than at higher prices, moving to DP can reduce price by more in the low-cost market than
it raises price in the other market and not due to greater demand curvature at lower prices,
which explains why output can decrease. In some such cases, total welfare also declines, as
we show with an example. Interestingly, Holmes (1989) nds that classic third-degree price
discrimination in oligopoly also can reduce average price without expanding output relative to
UP, but due to di¤erent demand properties.
Overall, our analysis suggests that while there are exceptions cost-based DP in symmetric
oligopoly is broadly benecial. Furthermore, DP is more benecial for consumers and total
welfare than classic third-degree price discrimination. In both cases, consumers gain from the
price dispersion by adjusting quantities. But price discrimination has a bias to raise average
price, which harms consumers, whereas cost-based DP does not, for a broad class of demand
functions. Regarding total welfare, classic price discrimination misallocates output while UP
does not, whereas when markets di¤er in costs of service, UP misallocates output and DP can
improve the allocation. We provide an example where markets di¤er both in costs of service and
in demand elasticities and, as expected, di¤erential pricing is benecial for consumers as well as
rms if the cost di¤erences are large relative to the demand di¤erences.
Do the generally favorable e¤ects of DP persist when rms are asymmetric? An extension
5 In such cases, rms would jointly gain from committing to uniform pricing, but such a commitment would
not be unilaterally optimal.
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of our main model introduces cost asymmetries between rms in a given market. We start
with the case where rms sell homogeneous products.6 In one scenario, the same rm has a
cost advantage in both markets. It captures both markets while pricing at the rivals relevant
marginal cost the market-specic cost under DP or the average of marginal costs under UP.
Average price under DP then equals the uniform price, hence consumer surplus must rise due
to price dispersion, but prot of the lower-cost rm can readily fall if the di¤erence in its costs
across markets is lower than for the rival (Proposition 4). Intuitively, the rm su¤ers from
having to set a price di¤erential that exceeds its cost di¤erential.
In an alternative scenario, each rm has a cost advantage in one market (but under UP each
rm must serve both markets). Under DP the equilibrium price in each market now equals the
marginal cost of the higher-cost rm for that market; whereas under UP the single equilibrium
price equals the marginal cost of the rm with the higher marginal cost averaged across the
markets. Average price across markets under DP then exceeds the uniform price, because cost
dispersion which determines equilibrium markups is higher under DP than under UP. If cost
heterogeneity between rms is large relative to that across markets, DP reduces consumer surplus
as the price-increasing e¤ect dominates the benecial price dispersion e¤ect (Proposition 5).
When rms have asymmetric costs and supply homogeneous products, therefore, DP can
reduce either prot or consumer surplus even for simpledemand functions such as linear. As a
robustness check, we extend these ndings to symmetrically di¤erentiated products with a linear
demand system from Shubik and Levitan (1980), showing that DP can reduce either prot or
consumer surplus if products are su¢ ciently close substitutes (Proposition 6).
To our knowledge, the only other analysis addressing cost-based DP in oligopoly is by Adachi
and Fabinger (2019). Our contributions are complementary. Adachi and Fabinger add cost dif-
ferences between markets to Holmes(1989) symmetric oligopoly setting. They provide su¢ cient
conditions for DP to lower or raise total welfare, using similar techniques as Aguirre, Cowan and
Vickers (2010; ACV), who study monopoly price discrimination with no cost di¤erences. Their
conditions resemble ACVs, in comparing weighted markups between markets at the equilibrium
price(s), but are more complex due to the role of cross-price e¤ects in the weights. Our analysis
6Since DP by symmetric rms is always benecial with homogeneous products (Bertrand competition then
yields the same rst-best outcome as perfect competition), this case sharply highlights the role of cost asymmetries.
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of symmetric oligopoly assumes equally-elastic demands across markets in order to focus sharply
on the role of cost di¤erences. By analyzing when each welfare measure is a convex function of
marginal cost, we provide transparent necessary and su¢ cient conditions on the demand system
for DP to raise or lower consumer surplus, prot, or total welfare, and decompose the underlying
forces. In addition, we highlight the e¤ects of cost asymmetries between rms.
The next section presents the main model and some preliminary results. Section 3 analyses
the e¤ects of DP with symmetric rms. Section 4 considers the extension where rms have
asymmetric costs. We conclude in Section 5, and gather all proofs in the Appendix.
2. A Model With Symmetric Firms
Two rms each produce one product. The demand function for rm i; i = 1; 2; is Di (p1; p2) :
There are two distinct groups of consumers or markets, L and H: Each rms constant marginal
cost is cL to serve group L and cH to serve group H, with 0  cL < cH : Group Ls demand for
rm is product is Di (p1; p2) and group Hs demand is (1  )Di (p1; p2) for  2 (0; 1). Since
these demand functions di¤er only in scale, they have equal price elasticities at any common
prices, but the (constant) marginal costs of serving the groups di¤er.
Firms compete by simultaneously choosing prices, possibly in one of two pricing regimes.
Under uniform pricing (UP) each rm can only set a single price for all consumers, whereas
under di¤erential pricing (DP) each rm can charge two di¤erent prices for the two distinct
consumer groups.
Following Holmes (1989), the rms produce symmetrically di¤erentiated substitute products
with Di(p1; p2) being a continuous and di¤erentiable function7 satisfying
Di (x; y) = Dj (y; x) for rm i 6= j = 1; 2: (1)
At equal prices pi = pj  p; we further dene the industry demand as
D (p)  2Di (p; p) for i = 1; 2: (2)
7We shall also briey address the case where the two symmetric rms produce a homogeneous product so that
Di (pi; pj) is not continuous at pi = pj : The analysis is then straightforward.
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This setting lets us compare for symmetric duopoly the welfare properties of di¤erential pricing
motivated solely by cost di¤erences between markets instead of solely by demand di¤erences as
in Holmes (1989).8
Given rmssymmetry, we will analyze the symmetric equilibria in which both rms charge
equal prices under UP or under DP. Under DP, each rm charges market-specic prices pL and
pH that maximize its prot for marginal costs cL and cH , respectively. Under UP, each rm
draws customers from groups L and H in proportion to their relative masses  and 1 , hence
its virtual marginal cost will be a weighted average of cL and cH ,
c  cL + (1  ) cH ; (3)
and the symmetric uniform price pu maximizes a rms prot for marginal cost c.9
We assume standard demand conditions such that DP raises price in the high-cost market
and reduces price in the low-cost market: pL < pu < pH . Let qu = D (pu) ; qL = D (pL) ; and
qH = D (pH) : Then qH < qu < qL; and qL  qL   qu > 0 while qH  qH   qu < 0: Dene
pd  pL + (1  ) pH (4)
as the average price under DP weighted by the relative sizes of the two groups, which equal their
relative consumption quantities under UP. If pd = pu; and consumers in the two groups were
to maintain the same consumption quantities as under UP, their total expenditure and welfare
would be unchanged. Under monopoly, or a homogeneous-product oligopoly with downward-
sloping market demandD (p) ; pd  pu is a su¢ cient condition for DP to raise aggregate consumer
surplus because consumers can advantageously adjust quantities to exploit price dispersion
purchasing more where price is lower and less where price is higher (Waugh, 1944). This su¢ cient
condition extends to symmetric oligopoly under product di¤erentiation as follows.
8Holmes assumes that marginal cost is the same across markets, but markets di¤er in demand elasticities such
that in symmetric equilibrium both rms charge a higher price in the same market (the strongmarket).
9At a common uniform price pu; rm is prot is
(pu   cL)Di () + (pu   cH)(1  )Di () = (pu   c)Di () :
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Suppose consumers have quasi-linear utility, denoted V (q1; q2)+q0; where q0 is consumption
of the numeraire good.10 Then, consumer surplus is
v (p1; p2) = max
q1;q2
fV (q1; q2)  (p1q1 + p2q2)g ;
with
dv (p1; p2) =  D1 (p1; p2) dp1  D2 (p1; p2) dp2:
When both rms charge the same price p, with D (p; p) = 2Di (p; p) from (2), we can rewrite
v (p; p)  S (p) so that aggregate consumer surplus is
S(p) 
Z 1
p
D1(x; x)dx+
Z 1
p
D2(x; x)dx =
Z 1
p
D(x)dx: (5)
Then, the consumer surplus under uniform pricing and di¤erential pricing are respectively
Su = S(pu); Sd = S(pL) + (1  )S(pH): (6)
Since S(p) is convex in p, we have
Sd   Su = S(pL) + (1  )S(pH)  S(pu)
> S(pL + (1  )pH)  S(pu) = S(pd)  S(pu)
 0 if pd  pu:
We thus have the following result, where rmsproducts can be either homogeneous or symmet-
rically di¤erentiated:11
Remark 1 DP increases consumer surplus if average price does not rise (pd  pu).
10Quasi-linear utility ensures that demand functions have equal cross-partial derivatives, @D1= @p2 = @D2= @p1;
hence consumer surplus is an unambiguous measure of consumer welfare with multiple products (its magnitude
is independent of the integration path along which prices are changed).
11 If there were n > 2 rms producing n di¤erentiated goods, consumer surplus could be similarly dened as
v (p) for price vector p = (p1; p2; :::; pn) : Then, under symmetry, we would have D (p) = nDi (p) ; and again
S (p) =
R1
p
D(x)dx: Thus, both Remark 1 and the prot decomposition in (7) below generalize to symmetric
oligopoly with n > 2 rms.
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Next, let the industry output under DP be qd  qL + (1  ) qH ; and also let q = qd  qu:
Furthermore, let mL = pL   cL and mH = pH   cH be the price-cost margins for the two
consumer groups under DP. The di¤erence of industry prot under DP and UP is
d  u = [ (pL   cL) qL + (1  ) (pH   cH) qH ]  [pu   cL   (1  ) cH ] qu:
The e¤ect of DP on industry prot can then be decomposed as follows:
  d  u =

pd   pu

qu| {z }
Average-P E¤ect
+  (mL  mH) qL| {z }
Reallocation E¤ect
+ mHq| {z }
Output E¤ect
: (7)
Since qL > 0; the reallocation e¤ect will be positive if the margin is higher in market L than
in H at the di¤erential prices (as was true under UP) and negative if the reverse holds. Under
classic third-degree price discrimination, i.e., markets face di¤erent prices but have the same
cost of service, the reallocation e¤ect is necessarily negative: output shifts to the market where
price fell and, hence, where the margin is lower. Thus, protable price discrimination requires
an increase in output or in the average price. In contrast, (cost-based) di¤erential pricing can
be protable even when output and average price fall, because the reallocation e¤ect will be
positive as long as the price di¤erence between markets remains less than the cost di¤erence.
This distinction will prove useful in Subsection 3.5.
3. Welfare Analysis
If the rms supply a homogeneous product, then under UP each charges pu = c = cL +
(1  ) cH , from (3); whereas under DP each rm charges pL = cL and pH = cH ; with average
price pd = pL + (1  ) pH = pu. Thus, DP obviously is benecial: consumer surplus is higher
under DP due to price dispersion, while prot is zero under both regimes.
However, the results are no longer obvious when products are (symmetrically) di¤erentiated.
The remainder of this section addresses that case. Subsections 3.1-3.3 analyze the e¤ects of
DP compared to UP on consumer surplus, prots, and total welfare, respectively, using general
properties of the demand system. Subsection 3.4 provides illustrative examples using specic
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demand functions. Subsection 3.5 compares the welfare e¤ects of our cost-based di¤erential
pricing to classic price discrimination (Holmes, 1989).
3.1 Equilibrium Prices and Consumer Surplus
Since market demands are proportional, markets essentially di¤er only in marginal cost c, as-
sumed symmetric between rms. Therefore, we can analyze the properties of all relevant vari-
ables as functions of c. Firm i chooses pi to maximize
i (p1; p2) = (pi   c)Di (p1; p2) ;
taking as given pj , with c = c under UP, and c = cL or cH under DP. A su¢ cient condition for
the existence of a unique equilibrium, which we shall maintain, is
 @
2i
@p2i
>
@2i (p1; p2)
@pi@pj
> 0: (8)
The second inequality implies that rmsprices are strategic complements.
The symmetric equilibrium price of both rms, p  p (c) ; satises the rst-order condition
@i (p
; p; c)
@pi
= Di (p
; p) + (p   c) @Di (p
; p)
@pi
= 0: (9)
Substituting the relevant value of c in (9) yields the equilibrium prices as
UP: pu = p (c) ; DP: pL = p (cL) ; pH = p (cH) :
Moving from UP to DP therefore can be analyzed as if marginal cost fell in market L from the
virtual level c to cL and rose in market H from c to cH . Prots per rm under UP and DP are
u  i(pu; pu); d  i(pL; pL) + (1  )i(pH ; pH): (10)
By the symmetry of demand, without loss of generality we can conduct our analysis for all
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variables associated with one rm. For rm 1, say, dene
own-price elasticity: 11 =  
@D1 (p; p)
@p1
p
D1 (p; p)
> 0 (11)
cross-price elasticity: 12 
@D1 (p; p)
@p2
p
D1 (p; p)
> 0 (12)
elasticity ratio: r 
12
11
> 0: (13)
As is customary, we assume  @Di(p;p)@pi >
@Di(p;p)
@pj
; hence r 2 (0; 1): A larger r reects greater
substitutability between the products.12
For a rms demand, dene also the
(margin-adjusted) curvature:  (p)  (p  c)
p
24 p
 @D1(p;p)@p1
d
dp
@D1 (p; p)
@p1
35 : (14)
The square-bracketed term is the elasticity of the slope of rm 1s demand with respect to an
equal change in both prices. Thus,  (p) = 0 ifD1 is linear, and  (p) > (<) 0 ifD1 is convex (con-
cave) in symmetric price p. For a monopolist with demand q = D (p) ;   pm cpm p
m
 D0(pm)D
00(pm)
is the curvature of the inverse demand function P (q) = D 1 (q) at monopoly price pm (e.g.,
Chen and Schwartz, 2015). Thus the equilibrium oligopoly version of demand curvature  (p)
would reduce to  under monopoly. Making use of (9), (p) can be rewritten solely in terms of
demand parameters as
 (p) =
D1(p; p)h
@D1(p;p)
@p1
i2 ddp @D1 (p; p)@p1 : (15)
The equilibrium price satises the familiar inverse elasticity rule: p
 c
p =
1
ii(p
) : Using (9),
the pass-through rate from marginal cost to equilibrium price is
p
0
(c) =  
 @D1(p;p)@p1
2@D1(p
;p)
@p1
+ @D1(p
;p)
@p2
+ (p(c)  c) ddp @D1(p
;p)
@p1
=
1
2  (+ r)
; (16)
12 In symmetric equilibrium, r equals the diversion ratio, a measure of substitutability commonly used in
antitrust (e.g., Chen and Schwartz, 2016). The diversion ratio from product 1 to product 2 is   (@q2=@p1)dp1
(@q1=@p1)dp1
=
12q2
11q1
; and q2 = q1 under symmetry.
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where  and r (and later also 
0 and 0r) are evaluated at symmetric equilibrium prices p =
p (c).13 Notice that p0 (c) > 0 under assumption (8).
Equation (16) shows that a marginal increase in c a¤ects equilibrium price under competition
through two channels. One is the curvature of a rms demand: p0(c) is larger when the rms
demand is convex ( > 0) rather than concave ( < 0), as under monopoly (Bulow and Pei-
derer, 1983). The second channel, specic to oligopoly, is the degree of product substitutability:
ceteris paribus, a higher r raises p
0(c). A common increase in marginal cost c will raise also
the rivals price, which magnies a rms own price increase assuming that prices are strategic
complements, and this cross-e¤ect increases with r.
We now can compare the uniform price, pu; with the (group-weighted) average price under
DP, dened in (4): pd  p (cL) + (1  ) p(cH): The di¤erence between pu and pd will a¤ect
the change in consumer surplus and in prots from a move to DP. Since
pu = p (c) = p (cL + (1  ) cH) ;
we have pu R pd when
pu = p (cL + (1  ) cH) R p (cL) + (1  ) p (cH) = pd:
That is, DP lowers average price if p (c) is concave, and raises average price if p (c) is convex.
From (16),
p
00
(c) =

0(p) + 0r(p
)
 h
p
0
(c)
i3
: (17)
Thus, p00(c) has the same sign as [0 + 0r], implying:
Remark 2 For all p (c) over c 2 [cL; cH ]: (i) If 0 + 0r > 0, then DP raises average price,
pd > pu; (ii) if 0 + 0r  0; then pd  pu.
Note that if [0(p(c)) + 0r(p(c))] has a consistent sign over the relevant range c 2 [cL; cH ],
then the condition in (i), i.e., 0 + 0r > 0, is su¢ cient and also necessary for pd > pu, and
13For a monopolist, with r = 0 and  = ; the pass-through would reduce to p
m0(c) = 1
2  . It is straightforward
to extend (9) to an n-rm symmetric oligopoly and obtain the pass-through rate in this more general case. Remark
2 and Propositions 1-3 below can also be extended to n-rm symmetric oligopoly, with proper modications.
11
similarly the condition in (ii) is also necessary for pd  pu. This observation also applies to the
subsequent Propositions 1 through 3.
If 0 + 0r  0; the pass-through weakly decreases with price, because at higher prices the
demand curvature term is lower (0  0) and/or product substitutability is weaker (0r  0).
Pass-through then will be smaller in market H, where a move to DP raises marginal cost (from
c to cH) and, hence, price, than in market L where marginal cost falls, explaining why the
average price weakly falls. Both  and r are constant for some familiar classes of demand
functions including linear and CES demands (see Subsection 3.4 below). For these classes of
demands, cost-based DP leaves average price unchanged.
The condition 0 + 0r  0, implying pd  pu, is su¢ cient for DP to raise consumer surplus
(Remark 1) but is not necessary since consumers gain from price dispersion. A tighter su¢ cient
condition is derived next. Rewrite consumer surplus (5) as a function of c
s(c)  S(p) =
Z 1
p(c)
D(x)dx: (18)
DP raises or lowers consumer surplus as s(c) is convex or concave:
Sd = s(cL) + (1  )s(cH) T s (c) = Su () s00(c) T 0:
When the two rms charge a symmetric price p; dene the price elasticity of market demand by
 (p)   D
0 (p)
D (p)
p: (19)
Then  (p) = 11 (p)   12 (p) ; the di¤erence between rm 1s own and cross price elasticities
when two rms have equal price p.14
Analyzing the sign of s00(c) yields a tighter condition than 0 + 0r  0, on the demand
parameters r = r (p) ;  =  (p) ; and  = (p), for DP to raise consumer surplus:
14Notice that our 11; 12; and  correspond to "
F
i ; "
C
i ; and "
I ; respectively, in Holmes (1989), with all elasticities
again dened as positive. In his notation, our elasticity ratio r, instead, is e
C
i = e
F
i :
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Proposition 1 Consumer surplus is higher under di¤erential pricing than under uniform pric-
ing if (20) holds, and is lower if the inequality in (20) is reversed.
 (0 + 0r)
2  (+ r)
+

p
> 0: (20)
The rst term in (20) is the average price e¤ect when moving from UP to DP. Since
1
2 (+r) = p
0 (c) > 0 from (16), the rst term takes the sign of  (0 + 0r). When 0 + 0r  0;
DP weakly lowers the average price, which benets consumers. The second term, p > 0, reects
the price-dispersion e¤ect: when the price elasticity of market demand  is higher, consumers
are more capable of making quantity adjustments and thus benet more from the price disper-
sion. On balance, DP raises consumer surplus if it does not raise average price too much, i.e., if
[ (p) + r (p)] does not increase too fast.
Under monopoly, the corresponding condition for DP to raise consumer surplus (Chen and
Schwartz, 2015) is
0 (q)
2   (q) +
1
q
> 0()  
0 (q) q0 (p)
2   (q) +

p
> 0:
We can view  (q)   qP 00(q)=P 0(q), the curvature of inverse demand, as corresponding to  (p),
and  0 (p) q0 (p) as corresponding to  0 (p). Thus, condition (20) in oligopoly reduces to its
monopoly counterpart for 0r = r = 0 and  = . Condition (20) holds for a broad class of
demand functions under oligopoly or monopoly (see examples in Subsection 3.4 and in Chen
and Schwartz, 2015) and, hence, DP tends to benet consumers.
3.2 Prot
Equilibrium prot for rm 1 under marginal cost c is
 (c)  1(p(c); p(c)) = [p (c)  c]D1 (p (c) ; p (c)) :
Thus, using the envelope theorem:

0
(c) =  D1 (p (c) ; p (c))| {z }
direct e¤ect
+ [p(c)  c] @D1(p
; p)
@p2
p
0
(c)| {z }
rivals e¤ect
,
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where the second term, the rivals e¤ect, can be rewritten as
D1(p
; p)

@D1(p
; p)
@p2
p (c)
D1(p; p)
 
p(c)  c
p (c)

p
0
(c) = D1(p
; p)(12=11)p
0(c);
using the inverse-elasticity rule (p(c)   c)=p(c) = 1=11. Since 12=11  r, we can express
0 (c) as

0
(c) =  D1 (p (c) ; p (c))
h
1  p0(c)r
i
: (21)
For a monopolist, an increase in c lowers prot because its prot margin for each unit of sales is
reduced. Under competition, this margin reduction is alleviated by the rise in the rivals price
due to the common increase in c; as reected in the additional term  p0(c)r in (21). Thus,
0 (c) < 0 if and only if p0(c)r < 1. Condition (8) for a unique equilibrium does not ensure
p0(c)r < 1, and we will consider also p
0
(c)r  1.
The result below is derived by analyzing when  (c) is convex or concave.
Proposition 2 Prot is higher under di¤erential pricing than under uniform pricing if (22)
holds, and is lower if the inequality in (22) is reversed.
r (
0 + 0r)
(2    r)
+ 0r +

p
[(2    r)  r] > 0: (22)
For a monopolist, in (22) r = 
0
r = 0, yielding simply 
2 
p > 0, which always holds.
It represents a monopolists gain from adjusting outputs across markets in response to mean-
preserving cost dispersion15 and is proportional to demand elasticity, akin to the exibility gain
for consumer surplus. As with consumer surplus, the condition for DP to raise prot in oligopoly
embeds and generalizes the condition under monopoly. Next, consider the three terms in (22)
for our oligopoly case.
The rst term in (22), r(
0+0r)
2  r ; takes the sign of (
0 + 0r) which determines the direction
of change in average price moving to DP. It a¤ects the rms prot via the rivals price response
to the common cost shocks (p0 (c) = 1=(2    r)), and in proportion to the substitutability
term, r. An increase in average price due to DP boosts industry prot because competition
15Recall that moving from UP to DP can be analyzed as a virtual decrease in marginal cost from c = cL +
(1  ) cH to cL in market L and an increase from c to cH in market H, with respective weights  and 1  :
14
under uniform pricing forces price too low from the standpoint of the industry.
The middle term, 0r, reects an output externality. Each rm sets its price based on the
rm elasticity of demand, 11, but when both rms adjust prices equally, output is determined
by market elasticity,  = 11   12. Since r  12=11 = 1   =11, if 0r(p) > 0, market
elasticity relative to rm elasticity is smaller at higher prices than at lower prices. Moving to
DP then induces a positive output externality on the rival rm: each rm ignores that (a) its
price increase in market H expands the rivals output and (b) its price decrease in market L
reduces the rivals output but e¤ect (a) exceeds (b) when 0r > 0: Oligopoly DP then yields a
larger output than predicted based on each rms own-elasticity, boosting prot.16
The last term, p [(2    r)  r], can be written as p 1p0 (c)
h
1  p0(c)r
i
: a monopolists
gain from adjusting prices and outputs across markets in response to cost dispersion, modied
in oligopoly by the impact of the rivals symmetric price responses (p0(c)r > 0). Suppose
p0(c)r 2 (0; 1); or
h
1  p0(c)r
i
> 0. In market H; where moving to DP e¤ectively raises
marginal cost, the rm loses from the cost increase, but less than if it were a monopolist. The
reverse occurs in market L, where moving to DP e¤ectively lowers marginal cost. Since the rivals
response in each market does not outweigh the own-cost e¤ect, cost dispersion still benets the
rm, in proportion to the elasticity of market demand.
However, it is possible to have p0(c)r  1 so that DP (weakly) decreases prot, unlike for
monopoly. The condition p0(c)r  1 requires p0(c) > 1 (since r < 1), hence the virtual cost
decrease in market L reduces the prot margin there; the reverse pattern occurs in market H,
where DP now increases the prot margin. Why, then, does overall prot fall? Observe that
mL  mH = cH   cL  
Z cH
cL
p
0
(c) dc > (=) < 0 if p
0
(c) < (=) > 1: (23)
Thus, when p0(c) > 1 the prot margin in market L under DP is lower than in H, hence
the output reallocation to L harms prot, by (7). For a monopolist, DP nevertheless raises
prot because p0(c) > 1 requires demand to be su¢ ciently convex that the monopolists price
dispersion expands output enough to outweigh the harmful misallocation (Chen and Schwartz,
16 In addition, when 0r > 0 DP tends to raise average price (see rst term in (22)), which also boosts prot.
Both e¤ects are reversed if 0r < 0, and DP then can reduce prot, as we will show.
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2015).17 In oligopoly, however, p0(c) = 12  r > 1 can arise not only from demand convexity
( > 0), but also from the cross-elasticity term, r. Indeed, the condition p
0(c)r  1 requires
both p0(c) > 1 and r large enough (though still < 1), so that the price fall in market L due
to rmsvirtual cost reduction moving to DP is driven su¢ ciently by product substitutability
rather than demand curvature, hence industry output does not rise too much.18 Example 2 in
Subsection 3.4 illustrates a case with p0(c)r ! 1 in the limit, hence DP can fail to raise prots.
A second way that DP can reduce prot arises when 0r < 0: DP then can lower both average
price and total output, and reduce prot due to the rst two terms in (22) (tracking the rst
and third terms in decomposition (7)). See Example 3 in Subsection 3.4, and Subsection 3.5.
Although DP by symmetric rms may reduce prot, the required demand conditions seem
rather special. In the normalcase (p0(c)r < 1), there is a systematic force pushing towards
greater prot: the benecial output reallocation e¤ect captured by the last term in (22). Prot
and consumer surplus both benet from greater scope for output reallocation under DP, a larger
elasticity of market demand . When rms have asymmetric costs, however, new forces will
emerge that can make DP harmful to consumers or prots even with simple demand conditions
(see Section 4).
3.3 Total Welfare
Given marginal cost c and the associated equilibrium price p(c), the equilibrium total welfare
in a market can be written as
W (p (c))  w(c) = s(c) + 2 [p(c)  c]D1(p(c); p(c))
= s(c) + [p(c)  c]D(p(c)): (24)
Analyzing when w (c) is convex, we obtain the following condition for DP to raise or lower total
welfare.
17From revealed preference, monopoly prots must be no lower under DP than under the constraint of UP. The
text explained why this holds even when p
0
(c) > 1:
18For a given own-price elasticity 11, a larger cross-elasticity 12 implies a lower market-demand elasticity .
Thus, for r  12=11 large (but still < 1), 11 can be high enough to render a unilateral price decrease protable,
yet  can be low enough that a price decrease by all rms is unprotable.
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Proposition 3 DP increases total welfare if (25) holds, and DP reduces total welfare if (25) is
reversed.
  (0 + 0r) (1  r)
(2    r)
+ 0r +

p
[(2    r) + (1  r)] > 0: (25)
The rst term corresponds to the rst terms in (20) and (22), reecting the net e¤ect of
change in average price on consumer surplus plus prot: when (0 + 0r)  0; average price
weakly falls, hence the net e¤ect is weakly positive due to industry output expansion given
1  r > 0.19 The second term, 0r; is the same as the middle term in (22) and captures the net
output externality under competition across the two markets, H and L. Together, the rst and
second terms in (25) reect how DP a¤ects total welfare through the change in total output.
The last term, p [(2    r) + (1  r)] ; corresponds to the output adjustment e¤ect: moving
from UP to DP creates price dispersion for consumers and cost dispersion for rms, leading to
benecial output adjustments in total, and a higher  magnies this e¤ect. DP can raise total
welfare due to both the (benecial) output reallocation and output expansion, but neither of
them alone is necessary for DP to raise welfare.20 And like its counterparts for consumer surplus
and prot, (20) and (22), condition (25) is met for a broad class of demands, such as those with
constant  and r, but not always; see Example 3 below.
The condition for DP to raise total welfare under monopoly (Chen and Schwartz, 2015,
condition (A1B)) can be written as
 0D0 (p)
(2  ) +

p
[(2  ) + 1] > 0;
and monopoly DP lowers total welfare if the above inequality is reversed. As with consumer
surplus and prot, the condition for DP to raise total welfare under oligopoly, (25), embeds and
generalizes that under monopoly: r = 
0
r = 0 for the single-product monopolist, while  in
oligopoly corresponds to  under monopoly and 0 corresponds to 0D0 (p).
Finally, observe that under monopoly, DP always increases prot, hence total welfare rises
under broader conditions than does consumer surplus (compare Propositions 1 and 2 of Chen
19Recall that 1  r = (11  12)=11 = =11, the market elasticity of demand divided by the rms elasticity,
and  > 0 since market demand is sensitive to price.
20 Importantly, output reallocation under pH   cH < pL   cL can improve total welfare even when total output
decreases, a key di¤erence between cost-based DP and price discrimination.
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and Schwartz, 2015). In oligopoly, DP can reduce prot, hence consumer surplus may rise yet
total welfare fall, as in Example 3. Thus, the conditions for DP to raise consumer surplus or
total welfare, (20) and (25), are no longer nested.
3.4 Examples
The ensuing examples show that the conditions in Propositions 1-3 for di¤erential pricing to
benet consumers, prots, and overall welfare, are met by familiar demand functions though
not always and illustrate the underlying economic forces.21 To that end, recall from (7) that
the output reallocation induced by DP a¤ects prot positively when mL > mH and negatively
when mL < mH ; and that mL > (<) mH if p
0
(c) < (>) 1; from (23).22 For abbreviation, we
use qi to denote demand for rm i0s product.
Example 1 Linear demand (DP increases consumer surplus and prot):
qi = a  pi + (pj   pi); a > 0;  > 0:
Then, r =

1+ ,  =
p
a p , and  = 0:
It follows that both (20) and (22) hold, hence DP increases consumer surplus and prot.
Average price and total output are the same under UP and DP, so the gains come solely
from reallocating output between markets. The gains can be signicant. For instance, if
fa; ; cL; cH ; g = f8; 1:5; 3; 5; 0:5g; prot and consumer surplus both rise by 6.25% when moving
from UP to DP; and if fa; ; cL; cH ; g = f8; 1; 2; 5; 0:4g, they rise by 12.24%.23
Example 2 CES demand (DP increases consumer surplus and prot):
qi = m
1
1 m p i

p1 1 + p
1 
2
 11 m 
 1
;  > 1; 0 < m <
  1

:
Then, p(c) = (1+ m)c2m+ m 1 , p
0(c) = 1+ m2m+ m 1 > 1, r =
 m 1
1+ m ,  =
1
1 m ,  =
4 2m
1+ m .
21Armstrong and Vickers (2018) characterize an important class of demand systems in which consumer surplus
is a homothetic function of quantities. The demand functions in our examples below are all part of this class.
22More details on the examples in this section are available upon request.
23This linear demand system is adapted from Shubik and Levitan (1980) and will be used again in Example 4
and in Subsection 4.2.
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Once again, both (20) and (22) hold, so that DP increases consumer surplus and prots.
Since  and r are constant, average price does not change, and DP increases consumer surplus
due to output expansion and reallocation. Although p0(c) > 1, hence the output reallocation
is excessive for prot, p0(c)r < 1 holds for all feasible parameters so prot still increases due
to the output expansion. However,
p0(c)r =
1 +  m
2m+  m  1
 m  1
1 +  m =
1  +m
1  +m (  2) ! 1 as m! 0 or as !1:
Therefore, in this example DP can fail to raise prot in the limit as m! 0 or as !1:
Example 3 Binomial Logit demand with outside option (DP increases consumer surplus but
can reduce total output, prot, and total welfare):
qi =
e
a pi

e
a pi
 + e
a pj
 +A
; A > 0;  > 0:
Then,
p = c+ +

Ae
 a+p
 + 1
; p
0
(c) =

e
a
 +Ae
p

2
e
2a
 +A2e
2p
 + 3Ae
a+p

;
r =
1
1 +Ae
 a+p

; 0r < 0;  =
A2e
2p

e
a
 +Ae
p

2 > 0; 0 > 0;  = Ae
p
 p
2e
a
+Ae
p
 
:
In Example 3, condition (20) always holds, hence DP raises consumer surplus. However,
conditions (22) and (25) can be reversed, so DP can lower prot and total welfare. For instance,
let A = 0:01; cL = 0; cH = 2,  = 1, a = 0, and  = 0:5: Then: mdL = 1:94 > m
d
H = 1:71,
so the output reallocation benets prot and total welfare. But DP lowers average price, from
pu = 2:85 to pd = 2:82; and lowers total output, from qu = 0:92 to qd = 0:90, causing prot
to fall: d = 1:65 < u = 1:71. The output reduction also reduces welfare, albeit slightly (by
0.067%). When  = 0:3; a = 0:5 instead, DP lowers prot, but the incremental gain in consumer
surplus dominates the reduction in prot, and total welfare is higher under DP.
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The price and output changes can be understood as follows. Demand is more convex at higher
prices (0 > 0), which pushes the pass-through p0 (c) to be increasing; however, the products
substitutability is smaller at higher prices (0r < 0), which pushes p
0
(c) to be decreasing. On
balance, 0+ 0r can be either positive or negative, depending on parameter values. As a result,
the average price may either increase or decrease under DP; and, associated with this, output
may either increase or decrease. But consumer surplus always increases under DP, primarily
due to the positive output reallocation e¤ect.
Summarizing our ndings, DP raises both consumer surplus and prot when the demand
curvature () and the elasticity ratio (r) do not change too fast relative to the elasticity of
market demand (): In particular, DP raises both consumer surplus and prot when  and r
are constant; such as for linear and CES demand. There are demands for which, under some
parameter values, prot or total welfare can be lower under DP than under UPs, but such cases
appear to be unusual.24
3.5 Comparison to Oligopoly Price Discrimination
For symmetric oligopoly, Holmes (1989) analyzed price discrimination rather than our cost-based
di¤erential pricing. Our results exhibit similarities to his ndings as well as di¤erences.
In both settings, di¤erential pricing cost-based or demand-based may reduce prot rela-
tive to uniform pricing, unlike for monopoly. Holmes shows this can occur if the market with
the smaller elasticity of market demand has the larger cross-price elasticity between rms. Price
discrimination then lowers price in the wrong market and can reduce total output. In our
setting, markets di¤er only in costs, but DP still can reduce output and prot if cross-price elas-
ticity relative to a rms own-price elasticity, for the common demand function across markets,
is greater at lower prices than at higher prices (Example 3). Then price can fall by more in the
low-cost market than it rises in the other market, while still reducing total output.25
Turning to consumer surplus, cost-based DP is more likely to benet consumers than is price
24Under our symmetric setting, we have not found an example in which DP lowers consumer surplus, even
though it is conceivably possible. However, as we show in Section 4, DP can lower consumer surplus if costs di¤er
between rms. Thus, our broad message is that DP is often, but not always, benecial to consumers.
25Additionally, cost-based DP can potentially fail to increase prot due to a second force: excessive output
reallocation between markets when p
0
(c) > 1, as in Example 2 when m! 0 or when !1 .
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discrimination. From our prot decomposition (7), protable price discrimination requires an
increase in total output or in average price; indeed, price discrimination has a tendency to raise
average price, which of itself harms consumers.26 By contrast, DP can raise prot even if average
price does not rise (Examples 1-2), which ensures that consumers also benet. The cost savings
achieved by reallocating output to the lower-cost market provide rms an incentive to adopt
DP also under demand conditions that do not yield an increase in average price, and consumers
benet from the price dispersion by adjusting their consumption patterns.
Total welfare also is more likely to rise with cost-based DP than with price discrimination.
Discrimination misallocates output between markets, hence an increase in total output is nec-
essary for total welfare to rise.27 In contrast, cost-based DP can increase welfare when output
remains constant, as with linear demand (Example 1),28 or potentially even when output falls,
due to the favorable reallocation to the lower-cost market (as in Example 3 for some parameters).
As a robustness exercise, we consider an example where markets di¤er both in their costs of
service, as until now, and in their demand elasticities.
Example 4 Markets di¤er in costs and demands (DP is benecial if the di¤erence in costs is
large relative to that in demands):
Firm i faces the following demand system (an extension of Example 1) in market k 2 fL;Hg,
qik = a+ bk   pik + (pjk   pik): (26)
Let bL = 0 and bH = b > 0 so that H is the strong market.29 As before, consumers are
distributed between markets L and H in proportions  and 1 , and the rms are symmetric in
each market with marginal costs cL and cH . In the Appendix we show the following when moving
from UP to DP: average price weighted by the consumption quantities under UP increases; total
26There is a sense in which discrimination increases averageprice; the increase in price in the strong market
above the uniform price is largerelative to the decrease in the weak-market price.(Holmes 1989, p. 248.) Under
monopoly, this price bias of price discrimination is discussed by Chen and Schwartz (2015, pp. 449-451).
27Holmes (1989, fn.2) notes that this well-known result under monopoly also holds for this oligopoly analysis.
28 In Holmessetting, price discrimination can increase or decrease output even with linear demand, depending on
his elasticity-ratio condition, which compares relative market-demand elasticities to relative cross-price elasticities.
When output falls, total welfare also must fall.
29Cowan (2007) also uses a shifting parameter in the demand function to capture di¤erent demand elasticity
across markets.
21
output does not change; and prot increases. Furthermore, there exist critical values b1 and b2
such that: i) consumer surplus increases if b  b1; ii) total welfare increases if b  b2.
The weighted average price is analogous to pd dened in(4), but the weights now reect both
the relative sizes of markets L and H ( and 1   ) and that per capita quantity under UP is
higher in market H: This weighted average price exceeds pu, unlike in the base model where only
costs di¤er, because price discrimination is now present. Prot rises for two reasons: the rise in
average price, and cost savings from reallocating output. Consumer surplus rises (due to price
dispersion) as does total welfare (due to cost savings) if the demand di¤erence between markets
is small relative to the cost di¤erence, so that di¤erential pricing is driven predominantly by
cost di¤erences. This generalizes the results from our main model where DP is driven solely by
cost di¤erences: there, DP always raises total welfare and its components under linear demand.
Notice that a similar result also holds under monopoly in Chen and Schwartz (2015).
4. Firms With Asymmetric Costs
Do asymmetries between rms introduce new forces, beyond demand-side factors such as pass-
through, that alter the welfare properties of DP relative to UP? We extend our model to allow
cost asymmetries between rms for a given market, in addition to cost di¤erences across markets
as assumed until now. Thus, rm i has costs (ciL; ciH) ; where ciH > ciL; for i = 1; 2: The rms
are still assumed symmetric in demand: they produce either homogeneous products (Subsection
4.1 below) or symmetrically di¤erentiated products (Subsection 4.2 below).
4.1 Homogeneous Products
Consider two scenarios of cost asymmetries:
(1) Global Cost Advantage: the same rm, say rm 1, has a cost advantage in serving both
consumer groups: c1L < c2L and c1H < c2H ;
(2) Local Cost Advantage: each rm has a cost advantage in serving a di¤erent group.
Without loss of generality, let c1L < c2L and c1H > c2H ; with c1  c1L + (1   )c1H  c2 
c2L + (1  )c2H .
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Global Cost Advantage
We adopt the standard assumption for Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs: the
lower-cost rm can capture the market by pricing at the rivals marginal cost. Assume also that
rmscosts are not too far apart, so the lower-cost rm sets price below its monopoly level, at
the rivals cost. Under DP, competition occurs market-by-market and the equilibrium prices in
the two markets are therefore:
pL = max fc1L; c2Lg = c2L; pH = max fc1H ; c2Hg = c2H : (27)
Under UP, we assume that the rm with the lower average cost can capture both markets
by pricing at the other rms average cost. Therefore, the equilibrium uniform price is given by
pu = max fc1; c2g = c2: (28)
The next result shows that, while DP benets consumers, prots can readily fall. The prot
comparison depends on the di¤erence in marginal costs of serving the two markets for rm 1
(c1  c1H   c1L > 0) relative to rm 2 (c2  c2H   c2L > 0).
Proposition 4 For any given pair of costs f(c1L; c1H) ; (c2L; c2H)g with c1L < c2L, c1H < c2H ,
and ci  ciH   ciL > 0; i = 1; 2:
(i) pd = pu, and hence Sd > Su;
(ii) with linear demand, d > u if c1 > c2 and d < u if c1 < c2;
(iii) relative to linear demand, d   u and W d  W u are higher if demand is strictly convex
and lower if demand is strictly concave.
Part (i) is straightforward. Consider part (ii). With linear demand, total output as well as
average price are the same under DP and UP, hence the change in rm 1s prot is determined
entirely by the reallocation e¤ect in (7). Firm 1s prices are set equal to rm 2s costs: pL = c2L
and pH = c2H : Thus, the industry prot is the same as rm 1s prot, and the di¤erence in rm
1s prot margins under DP between markets L and H is (c2L c1L)  (c2H c1H) = c1 c2.
The output reallocation under DP raises prot if the margin is higher in market L, which occurs
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ifc1 > c2; and lowers prot ifc1 < c2.30 Intuitively, rm 1 is harmed by being constrained
to adopt a price di¤erential larger than the di¤erence in its costs.
Turning to part (iii), in market H where price rises under DP, output decreases less if
demand is strictly convex instead of linear, while in market L where price falls under DP,
output increases by more if demand is strictly convex instead of linear. Relative to linear
demand, therefore, d u and W d W u are both higher if demand is strictly convex, and the
conclusion is reversed if demand is strictly concave.
Local Cost Advantage
Now suppose rm 1 has the cost advantage for market L and rm 2 has the advantage for H:
c1L < c2L < c2H < c1H , with c1  c2: Under DP, rm 1 serves market L at price pL = c2L < c2
and rm 2 serves market H at price pH = c1H > c2H > c2. Under UP, we assume that each
rm cannot refuse to serve its higher-cost market; it must be willing to sell in both markets or
none. Suppose also that at equal prices (p1 = p2), if c1 < c2, rm 1 can capture both markets
at price c2, while if c1 = c2, the rms split both markets equally. In both cases, the equilibrium
uniform price is pu = c2, and moving to DP lowers price in market L and raises price in market
H, but raises average price.31 The next result shows that while prot necessarily rises, consumer
surplus can fall without requiring unusual demand conditions.
Proposition 5 For any given pair of costs f(c1L; c1H) ; (c2L; c2H)g with c1L < c2L < c2H < c1H ;
and c1  c2:
(i) average price is higher under DP than under UP: pd > pu;
(ii) consumer surplus is higher under DP (Sd > Su) if cost di¤erences within markets, L 
c2L   c1L and H  c1H   c2H , are small, but Sd < Su if c2H   c2L is small;
(iii) prots are always higher under DP: d > u.
Result (i) above can be understood as follows. The uniform price is determined by the
rm with the higher average of the marginal costs across the two markets. Under DP, each
30With linear demand, total welfare rises if c1  c2, but can fall if c1 < c2. As c1 ! 0, the output
allocation under uniform pricing converges to the rst-best, but is ine¢ cient under di¤erential pricing, since
p1H   p1L = c2 > 0; hence W d < Wu:
31We have considered a variant of this scenario, where rm 1 has lower cost to serve market A than market B
and the reverse holds for rm 2. Di¤erential pricing then raises price in both markets.
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markets price is set by the higher of the two rmsmarginal costs for that market. Since cost
heterogeneity is greater market-by-market than on average, the average price is higher under
DP. The e¤ect is similar to one noted by Dana (2012).
Consumer surplus is subject to opposing e¤ects: it increases due to the price dispersion, but
decreases due to the rise in average price. When the cost di¤erence between rms within each
market (c2k   c1k, k = L;H) is su¢ ciently small, the average price under DP converges to the
uniform price, hence the price dispersion e¤ect dominates and DP raises consumer surplus. The
opposite arises if the cost di¤erence between markets for rm 2 (c2H c2L) is small: then pu = c2
is close to c2L; so that moving to DP lowers price in market L only slightly but raises price in
market H substantially. However, DP can lower consumer surplus even when c2H   c2L is not
small. For example, suppose  = 1=2, D (p) = 10  p; c1L = 3; c2L = 4, c2H = 6; c1H = 7: Then
c1 = c2 = 5 = p
u, pL = 4, pH = 7, pd = 5:5 > pu; and Sd = 11:25 < Su = 12:5.
Industry prots always rise with DP, for three reasons: as with monopoly, output is reallo-
cated to the lower-cost market; in addition, DP now leads to each market being served by the
e¢ cient rm in that market (rm 2 replaces 1 in market H) and, furthermore, DP raises average
price by relaxing the competitive constraint.
Summarizing, when a di¤erent rm has the cost advantage in each market, DP has opposing
e¤ects on consumer surplus. The price dispersion is benecial, but the increase in average price
is harmful. The rst e¤ect dominates if the cost heterogeneity across markets is large relative
to that between rms in a given market, while the second e¤ect dominates in the reverse case.
4.2 Di¤erentiated Products With Linear Demands
Propositions 4 and 5 showed that DP can reduce prot or consumer surplus even with simple
demand functions such as linear demand when rms have asymmetric costs and produce
homogeneous products, i.e., perfect substitutes. To check whether these ndings may extend
to imperfect substitutes, we consider di¤erentiated products with the following linear demand
system:
qi = a  pi + (pj   pi) for i; j 2 f1; 2g (j 6= i) , (29)
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where a > 0; and  2 (0;+1) measures the degree of product substitutability. The products
become unrelated (highly di¤erentiated) as  ! 0 and highly substitutable as  ! 1; with
equal marginal costs c, rmsequilibrium price converges to c as  ! 1. This system reects
the demands of a representative consumer with utility from the two di¤erentiated goods:
V (q1; q2) = a(q1 + q2)  1
2

 + 1
2 + 1
q21 +
2
2 + 1
q1q2 +
 + 1
2 + 1
q22

: (30)
As in Subsection 4.1, the two rms may have di¤erent costs of serving the same market; c1k
may di¤er from c2k; for k = L;H; in arbitrary ways including the cases of global or local cost
advantage.
Proposition 6 Suppose the demand system is given in (29). There exist critical values 1 and
2 such that:
(i) when  < 1, consumer surplus and industry prot are both higher under DP than under UP
regardless of the cost asymmetry between rms;
(ii) when  > 2, the following results in Propositions 4 and 5 hold: with global cost advantage
(c1L < c2L and c1H < c2H), DP reduces prot if c1H   c1L < c2H   c2L; whereas with local cost
advantage (c1L < c2L, c1H > c2H and c1  c2), DP reduces consumer surplus if c2H   c2L is
su¢ ciently small.
When the products are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated ( < 1); under both UP and DP the
equilibrium is interior, with both rms producing positive outputs and the prices determined by
the standard rst-order conditions. The average prices under DP and under UP are then equal,
as in the case of symmetric costs and linear demands (Example 1). Hence, consumer surplus is
higher under DP, and industry prot also is higher because it is a convex function of (c1; c2).
When products are su¢ ciently close substitutes ( > 2); under both regimes we have a
corner equilibrium. Under UP, rm 2 (the higher-cost rm here) sets price at marginal cost c2
while rm 1 captures the market by setting a limit price below c2 that induces zero demand
for rm 2, and this limit price ! c2 as  ! 1; and similarly under DP the lower-cost rm in
each market, L or H; sets a limit price to capture that market. Thus, as the products converge
to perfect substitutes, the outcome converges to the homogeneous-products case, described in
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Proposition 4 for global cost advantage and in Proposition 5 for local cost advantage.32
5. Conclusion
The welfare properties of uniform versus di¤erential pricing in oligopoly when markets di¤er in
costs of service have gone largely unexplored, despite the prevalence of industries where rms
are constrained from adopting cost-based di¤erential pricing. In a standard setting where rms
face symmetric demands, we showed that the e¤ects of purely cost-based di¤erential pricing on
consumer welfare and prots depend on whether products are homogeneous or di¤erentiated
and whether rms are symmetric in costs or not.
With symmetric rms, if products are homogeneous then di¤erential pricing obviously maxi-
mizes consumer welfare whereas uniform pricing does not, while prots are zero in both regimes.
If products are di¤erentiated, then di¤erential pricing increases consumer surplus and prots
under conditions met by many standard demand functions. The systematic force driving higher
prot is cost savings from reallocating output between markets by adjusting prices; consumers
benet from this price dispersion provided average price does not rise too much. Although prot
can fall with di¤erential pricing unlike for monopoly and potentially consumer surplus too,
such outcomes require demand conditions that seem rather stringent.
When rms have asymmetric costs, however, di¤erential pricing can reduce prot or, under
an alternative cost conguration, reduce consumer surplus even for standard demand functions
such as linear demands.
Thus, cost-based di¤erential pricing in oligopoly can have subtle welfare e¤ects. By eluci-
dating these e¤ects and the underlying economic forces, this paper advances our understanding
of a signicant issue in economics in parallel to the extensive studies on third degree price
discrimination and helps evaluate prevalent constraints on a common business practice.
32Chen, Li and Schwartz (2017, Proposition 5) considered an alternative linear-demands system: qi = a pi+ pj
for i 6= j = 1; 2,  2 (0; 1). The corner solution is absent in that model because the products do not converge
to perfect substitutes as  ! 1. The equilibrium then is always interior, and DP increases consumer surplus
and prots regardless of the cost conguration, consistent with our Proposition 6 for  < 1. The qualitative
di¤erence between the two types of equilibria seems to be that in an interior equilibrium prices depend on both
rmscosts, whereas in a corner equilibrium the price of the rm that makes positive sales is determined solely
by the rivals marginal cost.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Using (18), we have
s0 (c) = S0 (p) p
0
(c) =  D (p) p0 (c) :
It follows that
s00 (c) =  D0 (p)
h
p
0
(c)
i2  D (p) p00 (c)
=  D0 (p)
h
p
0
(c)
i2  D (p)  0r + 0 hp0(c)i3
=
 D0 (p)
D(p)
   0r + 0 p0(c)D(p) p0(c)2
=


p
  
0
r + 
0
2    r

D(p)

p0(c)
2
Thus,
Sign s00(c) = Sign


p
  
0
r + 
0
2    r

Therefore, if (20) holds, s (c) is convex and
Su = S (pu (c)) = s (c) = s (cL + (1  ) cH)
< s (cL) + (1  ) s (cH) = S (p (cL)) + (1  )S (p (cH)) = Sd:
Similarly, if (20) is reversed, then s (c) is concave and DP lowers consumer surplus.
Proof of Proposition 2. We derive the condition for equilibrium prot  (c) to be convex
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as follows:

00
(c) =
dD1 (p
; p)
dp
p
0
(c)
h
p
0
(c)r   1
i
+D1(p
; p))

p
00
(c)r +
h
p
0
(c)
i2
0r

=
D1(p
; p)p0(c)
p
8>>><>>>:
 D0(p(c))p
D(p(c))| {z }
(p)
h
1  p0(c)r
i
+ p
 
0r + 
0 hp0(c)i2 r + p0(c)0r
9>>>=>>>;
=
D1(p
; p)p0(c)
p



1  r
2    r

+ p

(0r + 0) r
(2    r)2
+
0r
2    r

=
D1(p
; p) [p0(c)]2
p

 [(2    r)  r] + p

(0r + 0) r
(2    r)
+ 0r

:
Therefore, we have
Sign 
00
(c) = Sign

r (
0 + 0r)
(2    r)
+ 0r +

p
[(2    r)  r]

:
Denote the equilibrium prots of each rm under uniform pricing by u =  (c) ; and under
di¤erential pricing by d =  (cL) + (1  )  (cH) : Then, when 00 (c) R 0;
u =  (c) Q  (cL) + (1  ) (cH) = d:
Therefore, for r = r (p) ;  =  (p) ; and  =  (p): 
00 (c) > 0 or d > u if (22) holds, and
d < u if (22) is reversed.
Proof of Proposition 3. From (24),
w0(c) =  D (p) p0(c) +
h
p
0
(c)  1
i
D(p(c)) + [p(c)  c]D0(p(c))p0(c)
= p0(c)D0(p(c))(p(c)  c) D(p(c)):
But because pD
0(p(c))
D(p(c)) =  11 + 12 and p
(c) c
p =
1
11
; we have
w0(c) =  D(p(c)) p0(c) (1  r) + 1 :
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It follows that
w00(c) =  D0(p(c))p0(c) 1 + p0(c) (1  r) D(p(c)) hp00(c) (1  r)  p0(c)2 0ri
=  D0(p(c))p0(c) 1 + p0(c) (1  r) D(p(c)) h 0r + 0 p0(c)3 (1  r)  p0(c)2 0ri
R 0
()  D
0(p(c))
D(p(c))

1 + p0(c) (1  r)
   0r + 0 hp0(c)i2 (1  r)  p0(c)0r R 0()


1 +
1  r
2  r   

+ p
  [0 + 0r] (1  r)
[2  r   ]2
+
0r
2  r   

R 0:
  (0 + 0r) (1  r)
(2  r   )
+ 0r +

p
[(2    r) + (1  r)] R 0:
When w00(c) R 0, we have
W (p (c)) = w(c) = w(cL + (1  )cH)
Q w(cL) + (1  )w(cH) = W (p (cL)) + (1  )W (p (cH)) :
Proof of Example 4. Under DP, the symmetric equilibrium price and each rms output and
prot in market k 2 fL;Hg can be written as:
pk =
a+ bk + ck(1 + )
2 + 
; qk =
k(a+ bk   ck)(1 + )
2 + 
; k =
k(a+ bk   ck)2(1 + )
(2 + )2
in which k =  for k = L and k = 1   for k = H.
Total consumer surplus in market k is33
sk =
k(a+ bk   ck)2(1 + )2
(2 + )2
:
33The consumer surplus in market k can be calculated using the representative consumers utility in market k
Vk (q1; q2) = (a+ bk)(q1 + q2)  1
2

 + 1
2 + 1
q21 +
2
2 + 1
q1q2 +
 + 1
2 + 1
q22

: (31)
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Under UP, at symmetric price (p; p), each rms demand in market k is proportional to
a + bk   p. Therefore, a rms demand across both markets is (a   p) + (1   )(a + b   p) if
p  a. If a + b > p > a, market L is not served and each rms demand is (1   )(a + b   p).
Thus, both markets will be served if and only if the equilibrium symmetric price satises p  a.
We shall analyze this case, which holds when b  (a c)(1+)1  , where c was dened in (3).
With both markets served, the symmetric equilibrium price and each rms output are:
pu =
a+ (1  )b+ c(1 + )
2 + 
; qu =
(a+ b(1  )  c)(1 + )
2 + 
;
and each rms equilibrium prot is
u = (a  pu)(pu   cL) + (1  )(a+ b  pu)(pu   cH)
= (a  pu)(pu   c) + (1  )b(pu   cH)
=
((a  c)(1 + )  b(1  )) (a+ b(1  )  c)
(1 + )2
+ b(1  )

 cH + a+ b(1  ) + c(1 + )
2 + 

:
Total consumer surplus under UP is
Su =  a2 + b2(1  ) + 2 ((a  c)(1 + )  b(1  )) (a+ b(1  ))
(2 + )
+
(a+ b(1  ) + c(1 + ))2
(2 + )2
:
Note that the per-capita equilibrium quantity in market k under UP is given by
bqL  qiL j(pu;pu)= a  pu; bqH  qiH j(pu;pu)= a+ b  pu: (32)
Then bqkqu  bk, k 2 fL;Hg, is the share of total quantity demanded in market k under UP in
equilibrium. Using these shares as weights, the weighted average price under DP exceeds the
uniform price:
bLpL + bHpH   pu = b (b+ (cH   cL)(1 + )) (1  )
(1 + )(a+ b(1  )  c) > 0:
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Observing that qu = qL + qH , total quantity demanded from each rm remains unchanged.
Industry prot is higher under DP:
d  u = 2 (L + H   u) = 2 (b(1 + ) + cH   cL) (b+ (cH   cL)(1 + )) (1  )
(2 + )2
> 0:
The change in consumer surplus is
Sd   Su = sL + sH   Su
=
1
(2 + )2
(b+ (cH   cL)(1 + )) ((cH   cL)(1 + )  b(3 + 2)) (1  ):
Let b1 = minf (a c)(1+)1  ; (cH cL)(1+)(3+2) g. Therefore, Sd  Su if b  b1.
Comparing total welfare gives
W d  W u = d  u + Sd   Su
=
(1  ) (b+ (cH   cL)(1 + )) ((3 + )(cH   cL)  b)
(2 + )2
:
Let b2 = minf (a c)(1+)1  ; (cH   cL)(3 + )g > b1. Therefore, W d W u if b  b2.
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) From (27) and (28):
pd = pL + (1  )pH = c2L + (1  )c2H = pu:
Then Sd > Su holds, from Remark 1.
(ii) For prot we only need to consider rm 1, since the higher-cost rival earns no prot under
either pricing regime. Given pd = pu, linear demand implies that total output also remains
unchanged:
qd = D(pL) + (1  )D(pH) = D(pL + (1  )pH) = D(pu) = qu:
With pd = pu and qd = qu, (7) implies that sign(d   u) = sign(mL  mH). Since pL = c2L
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and pH = c2H , we have
mL  mH = (c2L   c1L)  (c2H   c1H) = c1H   c1L   (c2H   c2L)  c1  c2:
(iii) From (27) and (28), the prices pL; pH and pu are determined by rm 2s marginal costs
independent of the curvature of D(p). Suppose D(p) is strictly convex. Consider the linear
demand L(p) that is tangent to D(p) at pu.34 Uniform pricing yields the same price and output
with L(p) or D(p), hence the same prot and welfare. But under di¤erential pricing, since
pd = pu, outputs in both markets will be greater with D(p) than with L(p). Since rm 1s
margins in both markets are positive (pL = c2L > c1L, pH = c2H > c1H), prot and total welfare
will be higher with D(p) than with L(p). The reverse holds if D(p) is strictly concave.
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) Price: pd = c2L + (1  ) c1H > c2L + (1  ) c2H = c2 = pu.
(ii) Consumer Surplus:
Su = s (c2) =
Z 1
c2
D (p) dp;
Sd = s (c2L) + (1  ) s (c1H) = 
Z 1
c2L
D (p) dp+ (1  )
Z 1
c1H
D (p) dp:
When L  c2L   c1L ! 0 and H  c1H   c2H ! 0; c2L + (1  ) c1H ! c2; and hence,
because s (p) is strictly convex,
Su = s (c2)! s (c2L + (1  ) c1H) < s (c2L) + (1  ) s (c1H) = Sd:
On the other hand, when c2L ! c2H so that c2L ! c2;
Sd   Su = 
Z c2
c2L
D (p) dp  (1  )
Z c1H
c2
D (p) dp < 0:
(iii) Prots: Under UP, rm 2s prot is zero, but under DP, each rm earns positive prot.
34The ensuing argument is inspired by Malueg (1993).
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Total prots under the two regimes are
u = (c2   c1)D(c2);
d = d1 + 
d
2 = (c2L   c1L)D(c2L) + (1  )(c1H   c2H)D(c1H):
Thus,
d  u = (c2L   c1L)D(c2L)  (c2   c1)D(c2) + (1  )(c1H   c2H)D(c1H)
> (c2L   c1L)D(c2L)  (c2L   c1L)D(c2)  (1  )(c2H   c1H)D(c2)
= (c2L   c1L) [D(c2L) D(c2)] + (1  )(c1H   c2H)D(c2) > 0:
Proof of Proposition 6. Following Section 4.1, suppose c1 < c2. Under UP, rm i0s prot
function is:
i = (pi   ci) (a  pi + (pj   pi) ) :
Suppose   u  3a+c1 4c2+
p
9a2 2ac1+c21 16ac2+8c22
2(c2 c1) . Using the rst order conditions, the
equilibrium prices and outputs of rms i 6= j = 1; 2 are:
pui =
a(2 + 3) + (1 + ) (cj + 2ci(1 + ))
4 + 8 + 32
;
qui =
(1 + )
 
cj(1 + ) + a(2 + 3)  ci(2 + 4 + 2)

4 + 8 + 32
 0:
Note that if  > u, then qu2 < 0 and the above p
u
i and q
u
i no longer form an equilibrium.
Instead, the equilibrium will be a corner solution, described shortly.
Similarly, under DP, for k = L;H; there exists k such that if   k, the equilibrium prices
and quantities of rms i 6= j = 1; 2 are:
pik =
a(2 + 3) + (1 + ) (cjk + 2cik(1 + ))
4 + 8 + 32
;
qik =
(1 + )
 
cjk(1 + ) + a(2 + 3)  cik(2 + 4 + 2)

4 + 8 + 32
 0;
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while if  > k; and cik > cjk, then qik < 0 and the equilibrium instead will be a corner solution.
Hence, when   1  minfu; L; Hg, the average prices under DP and UP are equal:
pd1 = p1L + (1  ) p1H = pu1 ; pd2 = p2L + (1  ) p2H = pu2 :
Furthermore, it is straightforward to verify that when   1, in equilibrium consumer surplus
as a function of (q1; q2) and industry prot as a function of (c1; c2) are convex, implying that
consumer surplus, industry prot and total welfare are all higher under DP than under UP.
Now turn to the case where  > 2  maxfu; L; Hg. Suppose ci < cj . Under UP, the
equilibrium is a corner solution in which puj = cj and rm i captures all consumers in both
markets by setting a limit price pui that induces zero demand from rm j:
quj = a  puj + (pui   puj ) = 0;
where pui =
(+1)cj a
 and q
u
i =
(a cj)(1+2)
 .
Similarly, under DP, the equilibrium is a corner solution in which the higher cost rm sets
price pjk = cjk and the lower cost rm chooses price pik =
(+1)cjk a
 that induces zero demand
from rm j in market k.
Suppose rm 1 has global cost advantage with c1k < c2k as in Proposition 4. Then, pu2 = c2
and pu1 =
(+1)c2 a
 under UP, and p2k = c2k and p1k =
(+1)c2k a
 in market k under DP. Firm
2 receives zero prot under both DP and UP. For rm 1, we have pd1   pu1 = 0 and q1 = 0.
Thus, using (7),  = d  u = d1   u1 has the same sign as m1L  m1H . Note that
m1L  m1H = (p1L   c1L)  (p1H   c1H) =

( + 1)c2L   a

  c1L

 

( + 1)c2H   a

  c1H

= (c1H   c1L)   + 1

(c2H   c2L) < 0
holds if c1 <
+1
 c2. Thus, 
d > u if c1 >
+1
 c2 and 
d < u if c1 <
+1
 c2.
Next consider local cost advantage with c1L < c2L, c1H > c2H , and c1  c2. Under UP,
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qu2 = 0 and q
u
1 =
(a c2)(1+2)
 . Consumer surplus can be computed as
Su = U(qu1 ; q
u
2 )  pu1qu1   pu2qu2 =
(a  c2)(1 + )(1 + 2)
22
:
Similarly, consumer surplus under DP can be computed as
sdL =
(a  c2H)(1 + )(1 + 2)
22
; sdH =
(a  c1H)(1 + )(1 + 2)
22
:
Therefore,
S = Sd   Su = sdL + (1  )sdH   Su
= 
(a  c2H)(1 + )(1 + 2)
22
+ (1  )(a  c1H)(1 + )(1 + 2)
22
  (a  c2)(1 + )(1 + 2)
22
=
(1 + )(1 + 2)(1  ) (c2H   c2L)2  (2a  c1H   c2H)(c1H   c2H)
22
;
with S < 0 if c2H   c2L is su¢ ciently small, and S > 0 if c1H   c2H is su¢ ciently small.
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